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M'Naghten v. Durham
Lee E. Skeel*
N O ONE WILL TAKE ISSUE with the proposition that enforcement
of law is the chief means by which society keeps the peace
within the social state. Having its beginning in the formerly
recognized right of a party to seek vengeance against one who
inflicted physical injury upon him, the enforcement of criminal
law progressed to the point where it has become solely the
province of the State, accomplished by the imposition of sanctions
through the judgment of a court pronounced after trial of the
issues as provided by law. The legal rights of persons whose per-
sonal or property interests have been injured by defendants act-
ing in violation of law are the principal concern of the State,
and the protection of such rights is the purpose of enforcement
of criminal law. Many of the so-called safeguards circumscrib-
ing the power of the State in criminal proceedings have come
about in order to assure a fair trial to the defendant. It is the
purpose of these procedural requirements to protect a defendant
in a criminal prosecution against the misuse of the power of the
State. But these safeguards do not in any way change the pur-
poses to be accomplished in a criminal prosecution. It is in every
sense of the term a judicial proceeding, carried on as provided
by law, to protect members of society against injury through
criminal conduct.
It must be admitted that the process works backward.
Rather than attempting to prevent the criminal (insofar as his
unlawful tendencies can be anticipated) from indulging in his
criminal depredations, the process is to impose penalties as pun-
ishment after the unlawful act has been committed, probably
expecting that the penalty will deter further unlawful acts on
his part. It is also considered that because of public knowledge
of the imposition of sanctions by public authority upon an of-
fender, resulting from antisocial conduct defined as criminal,
others will be restrained from indulging in conduct of like
character because of the fear of suffering similar punishment
under like circumstances. This is not to say that the great ma-
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jority of the people, having a basic sense of social responsibility,
and whose lives are directed in their social relation by an abid-
ing sense of morality, do not, under some circumstances, need
the persuasion of the public authority to resist criminal conduct.
One of the basic elements of most of the crimes as defined
by statute (and at common law) that must be established in
proving the guilt of a defendant is that the criminal act was
knowingly and purposely done. There are, of course, varying
circumstances within which the requirement of establishing a
"guilty mind" as a prerequisite to legal guilt in a particular case
is to be determined. In some cases, knowingly committing an
act which results in harm to another is sufficient in itself, if the
result was one which was reasonably foreseeable. In other cases
a specific intent to accomplish a particular result must have been
intended. There is also a class of cases where the performance
of the act is sufficient to make out a case and constitutes a crime
even though the mind is free of an unlawful purpose. The stat-
utes in such cases make it the duty of the individual to comply
with the law in all events, as necessary for the protection of the
health and safety of the people. Just how mental incapacity is
to be considered as a defense in these cases has been the subject
of extended comment.
The subject of insanity as a defense to a charge of criminal
conduct is one which is now in great controversy. The common
law definition of what constitutes insanity of sufficient degree to
be a complete defense in the commission of a criminal act, and
under what circumstances "irresistible impulse" may be urged
as a defense in a criminal act knowingly committed, is challenged
by medical and some legal authorities. The prevailing rule, long
established and followed by distinguished authorities, is that a
defendant who does not have sufficient mental capacity to dis-
tinguish between right and wrong is not legally responsible for
acts committed by him while in that state of mind. Such a de-
fense, under the Ohio law, is affirmative in character, whereby
the defendant must assume the burden of that issue and must
establish such defense, properly pleaded, by the preponderance
of the evidence.
Some writers have suggested that mental capacity, when it
becomes an issue in a judicial proceeding, is a medical problem
with which the lawyer is without competence to deal effectively.
This contention must of necessity include the proposition that
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol12/iss2/13
12 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (2)
jurors are also incompetent to determine the validity of such a
defense when the question becomes an issue of fact which must
be determined by judgments of laymen based on conflicting ex-
pert testimony of medical witnesses. It could be that, when
psychiatry progresses to a point of reasonable certainty (which
seems not in the near foreseeable future), the comparatively
few mental incompetents (that is, those who could successfully
establish the defense of insanity as now legally defined) could,
after compulsory examination, be isolated from ordinary social
activity and be subjected to necessary treatment. It seems
probable, however, that the legal requirement of due process
would bar any such attempt to put society in order by psychiatric
examination. Some of the past results, historically recorded, in
the release of dangerous criminals from prosecution, or their
release after trial resulting in a verdict of not guilty by reason
of insanity, where the rule of M'Naghten' was not the basis of
determining their mental capacity, do not justify reliance alone
on medical authority as to the degree of mental incapacity which
will be a complete defense for criminal conduct.
Beginning, therefore, with the proposition that the determi-
nation of unsocial conduct must be by or through the judicial
process after the act charged was committed, the question of
the mental capacity of the defendant as affecting his responsi-
bility for social misconduct needs definition in terms as clear and
as easily understandable by the average individual as is possible.
Mental capacity, when an issue in a criminal action, is a question
of fact for the jury the same as any other fact in issue in a ju-
dicial proceeding, and cannot be finally determined by the pro-
fessional guess of a member of the medical profession. This has
been the process by which the facts upon which social rights and
duties have been determined since the advent of the common
law, and in a free society no one has ever suggested a sounder
way to proceed.
The certainty and clarity of the definition of insanity in
M'Naghten's Case, as a defense in a criminal proceeding, can-
not be questioned. Its critics attempt to condemn it, but they
do not suggest a rule of certainty to take its place. While the
rule of M'Naghten's Case was not promulgated in the forensic
atmosphere of a trial, yet the question was presented to the
judges under circumstances such that, when they pronounced
1 M'Naghten's Case, 10 C1. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
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their conclusions as to what state of mind constituted a defense
in a criminal act, the rule pronounced had the force of law, as
shown by its almost universal acceptance by courts of last re-
sort where the question has been at issue.
The mental competence of a defendant charged with crime is
assumed in most jurisdictions, and the defense of insanity,
whereby the defendant's act is claimed not to have been know-
ingly and purposefully done because of lack of mental capacity,
as indicated is an affirmative defense. (In some jurisdictions,
where insanity is suggested, the burden of proving mental com-
petence is placed on the State). The issue, no matter on whom
the burden of proof is placed, is what state of mental incapacity
must be found by the trier of the facts in order to relieve the
defendant from the imposition of the penalties under law for
the commission of a public wrong. The question is crystalized in
part by the controversy between M'Naghten and Durham.2
The latter case injects the so-called rule of "irresistible impulse"
into the issue as a question of fact which, if established, creates
a complete defense, preventing the imposition of sanctions and
releasing the defendant from all control by public authority
except the judgment of the psychiatrist of the institution to which
he may be committed for medical care. The importance of this
fact, that a defendant is entitled to discharge from the criminal
charge, where he can show that he lacked mental capacity to
resist doing the unlawful act which he knew to be wrong or
unlawful when committed, seems to have been lost sight of. This
must be true unless the rules applicable to persons found not
guilty because of insanity are made applicable to those who are
able to distinguish between right and wrong, but who claim to
be unable to resist doing the criminal act, so that they may be
committed for institutional care in the same manner as those
found not guilty by reason of insanity.
The purpose of the criminal law is to protect society against
the depredations of antisocial persons. The enforcement of this
law supports that trait of character which governs most people
as to their social responsibility. Without such personal restraints,
which result from social principles governing the conduct of the
great majority of our people, free democratic institutions would
soon disintegrate. A free people can only be free by enforcing,
2 Durham v. United States, 214 F. 2d 862 (1954).
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even against themselves, the obligations necessary to preserve
the social order, without which all basic rights would be lost.
Therefore, we return to the question of whether or not
M'Naghten or Durham represents the rule of law best affording
protection to society and justice for defendants charged with
conduct destructive of community safety.
In M'Naghten's Case, the judges concluded:
1. Notwithstanding that a party accused did an act which
was itself criminal, under the influence of insane delusion,
with a view of redressing or revenging some supposed griev-
ance or injury, or of producing some public benefit, he is
nevertheless punishable if he knew at the time that he was
acting contrary to law.
2. If the accused was conscious that the act was one which
he ought not to do, and if the act was at the same time con-
trary to law, he is punishable. In all cases of this kind, the
jurors ought to be told that every man is presumed to be
sane and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be re-
sponsible for his crimes, until the contrary be proved to
their satisfaction; and that to establish a defense on the
ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that at the
time of the commission of the act the party accused was
laboring under such defect of reason, from disease of the
mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he
was doing, or as not to know that what he was doing was
wrong.
3. A party under a partial delusion must be considered to
be in the same situation as to responsibility as if the facts
in respect to which the delusion exists were real.
4. When an accused person is supposed to be insane, a medi-
cal man who has been present in court and has heard the
evidence may be asked as a matter of science whether the
facts stated by the witness, supposing them to be true, show
a state of mind incapable of distinguishing between right
and wrong.
The net result of the M'Naghten pronouncement is that, in
asserting the defense of insanity, it must be established that the
defendant lacked mental capacity as defined under the law;
that is, that as of the time the act was committed the defendant
could not, because of disease of mind, distinguish between right
and wrong.
Also, under the law of Ohio, when the defendant establishes
insanity (as thus defined) by the preponderance of the evidence,
he is to be found not guilty, even though all of the other elements
of the crime are established.
May, 1963
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There are, of course, many stages or degrees of mental ill-
ness. Only in cases where by reason of insanity the defendant
is without mental capacity to control his conduct within the
standards necessary to protect basic public morals and safety,
should the law grant complete immunity from the imposition of
sanctions for conduct constituting a criminal act.
As compared with the definite rule of M'Naghten, the Dur-
ham case introduces uncertainty into the law of criminal re-
sponsibility and abdicates the responsibility of the courts in this
field, where the issue of insanity is presented to the uncertainty
of the psychiatric expert. Durham was a derelict with a long
history of mental institutional care, his attendance at such insti-
tutions resulting in almost every case as the aftermath of a trial
on a charge filed against him for some criminal act. In the main
case he was charged with housebreaking. At the trial a lay wit-
ness was permitted to give his opinion of the state of the defend-
ant's mental health, which was that the accused was of unsound
mind. However, the psychiatrist, while testifying that the ac-
cused was of unsound mind, stated that he could not say that
the accused was unable to distinguish between right and wrong.
Upon this state of the record the trial court found the defendant
guilty. Upon appeal the judgment was reversed. The opinion
of the appellate court was divided into two parts, the second deal-
ing with the rule to be applied in determining the mental capacity
of a person charged with crime, which capacity is necessary if he
is to be held liable for his criminal conduct. Perhaps it is better
to state the question as being the test to be applied on the issue
of what mental capacity is necessary in order for a defendant to
be held responsible for committing an act which constitutes a
crime. The court, after claiming to disregard the "right and
wrong" test, as one discredited from a medical viewpoint, even
as supplemented by the so-called "irresistible impulse" rule,
stated the rule to be that non-liability must result when the ac-
cused is shown to be suffering from an undefined diseased men-
tal condition which deprived him of the will power to resist the
impulse to commit a criminal act, although he knew that what he
was doing was wrong, or in violation of law. In place of this ex-
panded definition of what defective condition of mind, by reason
of disease or congenital defect, constitutes a complete defense
to a criminal charge, the court held the rule to be simply that
"an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was
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the product of mental disease or mental defect." In explanation
of this statement of the suggested rule, the court said:
But under the rule now announced any instruction (to the
jury) should in some way convey to the jury the sense and
substance of the following: If you, the jury, believe beyond
a reasonable doubt that the accused was not suffering from
a diseased or defective mental condition at the time he com-
mitted the criminal act charged, you may find him guilty.
If you believe he was suffering from a diseased or defective
mental condition when he committed the criminal act
charged, you may find him guilty. If you believe he was
suffering from a diseased or defective mental condition when
he committed the act but believe beyond reasonable doubt
that the act was not the product of such mental abnormality,
you may find him guilty. Unless you believe beyond reason-
able doubt either that he was not suffering from a diseased
or defective mental condition or that the act was not the
product of such abnormality, you must find the accused not
guilty by reason of insanity.
The result of this decision is to open up the floodgates of
uncertainty as to criminal responsibility in cases where insanity
is claimed as a defense, or in jurisdictions where, when such
claim is made, the State must prove the mental soundness
of the defendant. The issue, where insanity is claimed as a
defense, is not concerned with the character of punishment that
should be imposed in the event that guilt is established. The
issue is whether or not the defendant is subject to sanctions of
any kind whatever, because of the criminal act committed.
When, under the law of criminal procedure, a defense is prop-
erly established, or where the burden of such issue when claimed
is put upon the State, and the jury finds for the defendant, such
verdict releases the defendant from the control of the court even
though the act committed was in fact a crime.
The difficulty of stating the legal meaning of "irresistible im-
pulse" as a defense for knowingly committing a criminal act is
one which its proponents have not been able to overcome. Cer-
tainly, where one has sufficient mind to distinguish between right
and wrong, it is almost impossible to designate the point of tran-
sition from an act committed as a result of an irresistible impulse,
said to be the result of disease of mind whereby he is relieved of
all legal responsibility, and an act under like circumstances re-
sulting from an overpowering passion, which, because of weak-
ness of mind the defendant was unable to resist. Take the case
May, 1963
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of one seeking exoneration from criminal liability because he
acted under an irresistible impulse said to result from disease
of mind in the performance of an act known to be wrong. If, for
example, the defendant knew that a policeman was standing by
when the urge to commit the act was being considered, are there
any cases on record where the defendant nevertheless surren-
dered to the so-called irresistible desire to commit an unlawful
act? Has anyone ever known a kleptomaniac or pyromaniac to
act otherwise than in secret? The fact that the defendant knew
that the act was wrong would be a deterring factor, with the
officer or other observers at hand. But this would not be so if
the defendant could not, because of disease of mind, distinguish
between right and wrong, or have conscious knowledge of his
wrongful conduct. In the latter case, exemption from legal sanc-
tions is justifiable, while in the case of one acting under a so-
called irresistible impulse in the known performance of a crimi-
nal act, release from sanctions cannot be justified. If the sanctions
to be imposed should be of a different character in the case of
one acting under irresistible impulse than those generally im-
posed under the law, such change, if justice requires it, is a
legislative matter. All criminal conduct is abnormal, and only
where all control is lost because of disease of mind or mental
incapacity to distinguish between right and wrong should the
release of the wrongdoer from the imposition of sanctions be
permitted.
The Supreme Court of Washington in the case of State vs.
Maish,3 reviewed the leading cases on this question, and con-
cluded that irresistible impulse to do an act which the actor
knows to be wrong, whether or not induced by or growing out of
mental disease, is not such insanity as will relieve the doer of
the act from criminal responsibility. The court cites and follows
State vs. Harrison,4 and State vs. Knight.5 In the Harrison case,
after quoting with approval State vs. Nixon,6 the court stated:
It seems to me to be very dangerous to life to tell juries that
a party may know the nature of his murderous act, and
know and be conscious that it is wrong and criminal and
yet be excused if he did the act at command of irresistible
3 State v. Maish, 29 Wash. 2d 52, 185 P. 2d 486 (1947), 173 A. L. R. 382.
4 State v. Harrison, 36 W. Va. 729, 15 S. E. 982 (1892), 18 A. L. R. 224.
5 State v. Knight, 95 Me. 467, 50 A. 276 (1901).
6 State v. Nixon, 32 Kan. 205, 4 P. 159 (1884).
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impulse; thus eliminating the knowledge of the wrong of
the act as an unessential unimportant element in the test. I
do not regard it essential to the safety of the parties charged.
Also, in the case of State vs. Cumberworth7 the court, after con-
ceding that if one is incapable, because of disease of mind, of
entertaining a criminal intent he must be exonerated, said:
But to extend the doctrine of immunity to cases where the
actor knows that he is doing what is wrong but claims his
inability to resist doing the act, even though such lack of
resistance is claimed to be the result of disease of mind, is
to project the judicial process into the realm of uncertainty
and speculation.
If there should be a need to change the character or
degree of punishment to be imposed on one guilty of crime,
because of partial mental incapacity due to disease of mind
including "irresistible impulse," or, the long standing rule as
to what degree of mental disability is sufficient to constitute
a complete defense on the ground of insanity, such changes
in the law should be the subject of legislation and not ju-
dicial decision.
As was said by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in State vs.
Gilstrap,8 the doctrine that a criminal act may be excused or
mitigated by an irresistible impulse where the offender has the
mental capacity to appreciate his legal and moral duty in respect
to it has no place in the law.
7 State v. Cumberworth, 69 Ohio App. 239, 43 N. E. 2d 510 (1942).
8 State v. Gilstrap, 205 S. C. 412, 32 S. E. 2d 163 (1944).
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